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Abstract: Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have rapidly become more common in various applica-
tions. At the same time, the need for a safe UAS operation is of great importance to minimize and
avoid risks that could arise with the deployment of this technology. With these requirements, UAS
regulators in the European Union (EU) are making large efforts to enable a reliable legal framework
of conditions for UAS operation to keep up with new capabilities of this technology and to minimize
the risk of property damage and, most importantly, human injury. A recent outcome of the mentioned
efforts is that new EU drone regulations are into force since 1 January 2021. In this paper we aim to
provide a sound overview of recent EU drone regulations and the main changes to the rules since the
first wave of regulations adopted in 2017. We highlight how such new rules help or hinder the use
of UAS technology and its economic potential in scientific and commercial sectors by providing an
exploratory investigation of UAS legal frames in Europe. An example of the impact of legislation on
the operation of one particular UAS in Germany is provided, which has been in use since 2013 for
atmospheric research.
Keywords: EU drone regulations; UAS operational categories; UAS classes; risk assessment
1. Introduction
In Europe, UAS regulations have varied substantially with large differences of require-
ments for flight permissions developing with the upcoming technology, and therefore UAS
operations are constantly changing with respect to needs and laws of EU member states.
Starting with terminologies in regulations, as a simple instance, EU countries use different
terminologies in regulations; e.g., unmanned aircraft system (UAS), unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), drone and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). For the purpose of uniformity,
in this paper we use the term UAS, and include all types of unmanned aircraft systems.
However, the term UAS refers to aircraft which are developed to operate without a human
operator onboard [1]. Over the previous decade, UASs have developed rapidly and become
valuable for various scientific and commercial applications. This can be seen by observing
the UAS market, which is growing rapidly, with estimated demand in Europe at 10 billion
euro annually until 2035; and might be over 15 billion euro annually by 2050 [2]. In various
UAS based application fields such as topographic mapping, infrastructure maintenance,
construction surveillance, inspection, etc., these vehicles serve primarily as a platform for
sensor payloads which can be an optical camera, a laser device, a synthetic aperture radar,
etc. In such applications, a key challenge is how to achieve a safe UAS navigation. To
reach the best safety level, it is requested to minimize the risks to other airspace users as
well as to both persons and property on the ground. UAS risk avoidance or minimization
requests a clear presence of UAS legalization which defines legal frameworks for UAS
planning and operation. The legalization should handle with common problems arisen in
UAS regulations such as time of operation, e.g., within/outside the rush-hour [3], safety
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and administrative issues that hinder the desired flexibility in the execution of adminis-
trative processes and impede the widespread utilization of the UAS technology [4]. From
this point of view, some national and international authorities and organizations for EU
aviation started to update and modernize the first wave of regulations adopted in 2017
with focus on: (a) keeping up with recent technological developments and new capabilities
of UAS, (b) seeking to accommodate user demands and (c) increasing safety level during
the operation. In this context, the recent outcome of the modernization is that the new
EU drone regulations are into force since 1 January 2021, which are seen as a positive step
towards UAS rules harmonization in Europe. Nevertheless, applying the new drone rules
into national legislation may probably not take place before the end of 2021. This is due
to many still open questions related to administrative and technical details that need to
be discussed, such as defining responsibilities of local authorities, etc. Of course, this will
only be possible with large efforts that can help in converting the European regulations
into federal and state acts.
However, this article is motivated by the desire to help understand recent UAS
regulations and to assist users in navigating through the administrative and bureaucratic
processes to implement an effective legal use of UAS. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to
provide a sound overview of recent regulation issues associated with UAS planning and
operation. The paper proceeds with background information about the importance of UAS
regulations as an indispensable prerequisite that dictates when, where and under which
conditions UAS can be operated. Next, the status of the regulations will be discussed.
Here, the most important amendments and changes in EU drone regulations since 2017
will be introduced. Finally, we address the impact of new regulations on UAS use and its
economic potential by providing an exploratory investigation of UAS legal frames. This
includes a global overview and thorough discussion of main regulations and criteria that
have to be considered in commercial and scientific sectors, civilian applications such as
transport, energy and utilities, agriculture, etc.
As an illustrative example, the procedure required to acquire the flight permission for
a particular system, which has been operated since 2013, is provided. The UAS “ALAD-
INA” [4], with a weight of 24.9 kg and a wingspan of 3.6 m, operated by the Institute of
Flight Guidance of TU Braunschweig, is applied for atmospheric research, thus for altitudes
up to 1000 m. The UAS has been operated on during different years in Germany [5–7], in
Benin [8,9] and in Svalbard [10,11].
2. Related Work
UAS have become relevant for various applications for many years, e.g., for atmo-
spheric research, UAS applications date back to the 1970s [12]. With the technical progress
and the disruptive miniaturization of sensors, also motivated by the telecommunication
industry, the capabilities of off-the-shelf-systems, including airframe, autopilot and ground
control station, have increased significantly. Such an inexpensive technology has become
more valuable in practical uses and opened new opportunities in scientific and commercial
sectors. As a result, the UAS traffic in the sky is continuously increasing; and this prompted
a focus on the need to increase safety factors for UAS operations. An increasing safety
level during UAS operation requests decreasing/minimizing the expected operation risks
and hazards that cannot only influence airspace users, but also persons and properties on
the ground. At the same time, avoiding/minimizing UAS risks needs a clear legalization
framework for UAS planning and operation. UAS legalization has already been discussed
in various publications. Literature reviews revealed that authors of relevant publications
dealt with UAS regulations from the perspective of one context (e.g., cost, privacy), opera-
tional aspects (e.g., operating time, risk avoidance), etc. Furthermore, one can observe that
this topic has been mostly addressed at national levels or covered a few states [4].
In terms of national legalization, as an example we refer to the contribution achieved
by Cramer and Wieland (2019), who reported about the UAS regulations in Germany and
the important changes from 2017 to 2018 in the context of UAS operation and safety [13].
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Another contribution, also focusing on the German UAS regulations, has been published
by Borst et al. (2020). The contribution discussed UAS operations in German airspace
according to the EU rules. It pointed out that Germany has created legal regimes to support
defining and realizing regulations for manufacturers and operators of UAS [14].
Prior to 2017, for flight operations of ALADINA, the 16 federal states of Germany were
responsible for flight permissions. The application for flight permission was submitted to
the respective federal aviation authority where the flights were planned. The following
documents were required: documentation of planned flight trajectories and flight times
with safe distance to infrastructure and persons, agreement of the owner or tenant of the
land where flights should take place, agreement of the natural protection agency, agreement
of the regulatory agency (“Ordnungsamt”) or the local police, technical description of the
UAS including safety aspects and procedures, description of the scientific purpose of the
measurements, description of the pilots’ experience and insurance certificate. Based on
this documentation, the federal aviation authority asked for a statement of the German
air traffic control (“Deutsche Flugsicherung”), who finally issued a NOTAM (notice to
airmen) warning pilots about the UAS activities in this area and up to the required altitude.
Based on this NOTAM, the certificate of the flight permission was granted with certain
obligations: besides the safety pilot, a second crew member was required to observe the
sky for potential other air traffic. The crew reported the beginning and end of activities
to the air traffic control. A contact phone number of the UAS crew was provided, which
had to be on stand-by during operation in case of any unforeseeable events. Sometimes
restrictions for operation times were imposed.
After 2017, universities were treated as public authorities. No official permission from
the aviation authorities was required for the operation of ALADINA and other UAS of the
same size and weight class. Flight plans were discussed directly with air traffic control to
issue a NOTAM, and, if necessary, a permission of the respective federal environmental
agency was required. Since 2021, the federal aviation authorities are again responsible for
ALADINA flight permissions. The required documents include a risk analysis according
to SORA (see Section 4.3). The exception is if the flights are directly authorized by a legal
entity, which can be the Federal Environment Agency, for example, or flights in military
restricted airspace.
However, in order for UAS to become an efficient and safe technology in a wide frame,
e.g., for public and land management authorities and institutions in Europe, and a reliable
base for company investments, a legal use of this technology on EU level is indispensable.
Thus, based on a pre-defined and clear legal use, a solid background of the rules can be
provided to UAS users to ensure the safety of UAS operation and the efficient use of EU
airspace. In this context, we notice that UAS regulators in Europe are increasingly relying
on the installation of UAS legal frameworks and airspace classification. An example for
a legal framework installation is UAV DACH, which is an association for UAS activities
in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and The Netherlands (www.uavdach.org) (accessed
on 11 April 2021). It takes an important role in developing and realizing UAS rules for
UAS safe operation and navigation. It promotes unmanned aviation in order to increase
its acceptance and cares for issues related to safety. Its aim is to satisfy the regulatory
relaxation needed by the commercial UAS sector in a way that allows for further drone
investment on the condition that the regulatory environment becomes clearer and friendlier
towards UAS operation and navigation. In general, airspace classification is similar for
EU countries. For instance, the German airspace is divided in controlled and uncontrolled
airspace. The controlled airspace is structured in the following categories: C (Charlie), D
(Delta), E (Echo) and Controlled zones CTR. Uncontrolled airspace G (Golf) is only usable
for UAS without an air traffic control clearance [15]. Uncontrolled airspace usually has an
upper boundary of 2500 ft (762 m) or 1000 ft (304.8 m) above ground level, depending on
location, and is not available at all around airport control zones.
The demand for uniform legalization is still a cumbersome task for regulators, because
regulations must encompass UAS technological developments and new capabilities at the
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same time as they occur [16] and, therefore, this leads to continuous updates of regulations
over time. However, for countries with existing UAS legalization, rules are constantly
being re-evaluated and harmonized; almost all listed regulations have been written or
amended within the past years [17]. Currently, many efforts towards harmonizing UAS
rules and adopting uniform regulatory standards are being undertaken by the European
Commission with a focus on introducing a proposal to integrate all UAS, regardless of their
size, into the EU aviation safety framework [18]. A very important step towards EU-wide
harmonization is the new EU drone regulations (which came into force on 1 January 2021),
which define rules for all EU countries, such as identification of airspace classes, UAS
operating categories, etc. In addition, the new EU regulations provide country-specific
requirements as national legal standards of the individual EU member states that must
also be met.
To this end, it can be seen that the further development and use of UAS technology
in Europe greatly depends on regulations governing the use of UAS in different EU-
states, and, therefore, we are motivated to highlight the development and impact of UAS
regulations according to the policies of EU authorizations involved in developing UAS
legal frameworks.
3. Development of UAS Regulations
3.1. Global Scale Regulations
When dealing with UAS regulations at global scale, it is important to address a brief
background of the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO (www.icao.int) (ac-
cessed on 16 April 2021). According to the Chicago convention in 1944, ICAO was founded
and is now directed by 193 national governments towards support and manage transport
issues. During the second informal meeting concerning the UAS (January 2007) of ICAO, it
was concluded that ICAO should serve as a central point for global interoperability and har-
monization in terms of the following: “(1) developing a regulatory concept, (2) coordinating
the development of UAS Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), (3) contribute
to the development of technical specifications by other bodies, and (4) identify communi-
cation requirements for UAS activity” [1]. However, UAS activities steadily increase and,
therefore, UAS operators are a fast-growing group of airspace users which need larger
portions of airspace for their operations. From this point of view, in the 40th assembly of
ICAO, September 2019, the safe and efficient integration of UAS into global airspace was
discussed. As an outcome, it emphasized the importance of reviewing and improving the
operational framework of UAS in technical, economic and legal fields [19].
3.2. EU Drone Regulations
We highlight in this section the status of the regulations with regard to policies of
organizations and authorizations entrusted with developing regulation concepts in Europe.
For a better understanding of the UAS regulations status in EU, we briefly review the
status of regulations and important issues adopted, before the new EU regulations were
approved on 1 January 2021 (Figure 1).
Starting from March 2017, the European Aviation Safety Agency EASA (www.easa.
europa.eu) (accessed on 06 April 2021) laid down the first wide wave of regulations focusing
on air traffic management and navigation services. This regulation wave classified UAS
in different categories according to the maximum take-off mass MTOM allowed for UAS.
Hence, it was distinguished between systems with MTOM < 5 kg, between 5–25 kg and
over 25 kg, as it is assumed that the risk is significantly related to the potential and kinetic
energy of UAS. In the same year, a new concept for basic regulations has been proposed
and discussed between the European Council, European Commission, and the European
Parliament, to regulate all UAS regardless of their MTOM [20]. In the following year, the
focus was on establishing a legal framework for a high uniform level of civil aviation safety
in the EU. The aim of the mentioned framework was to improve the overall performance
of civil aviation by adopting effective aviation policies in Europe [21]. As a result, rules for
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UAS operation and requirements for technology and personnel, including the involvement
of remote pilots, have been adopted at the EU level in 2019 [22].
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In a further step, EASA laid down the new UAS rules in December 2020, which are seen
as a development step based on the notice of the proposed amendment A-NPA in 2015 [23].
It introduces a thorough overview about two main parts: implementing regulations IRs,
(operations of UAS—Regulation EU 2019/947) and delegated rules DRs, (technical require-
ments for the design and manufacture of UAS—Regulation EU 2019/945). Implementing
rules—which are the main focus of this paper—lay down thorough provisions for UAS
operations. They provide regulations to personnel and organizations involved in those
operations. In this context, and for a safe UAS operation, IRs propose three categories of
UAS operations based on the risk the operation is posing to third parties [22]; these are:
open, specific and certified (Figure 2).
• UAS operation category “open”.
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The open category is denoted as being low risk during UAS activities. The main
advantage, therefore, is the possibility to fly without an operating license that is requested
by other categories and needs a certain amount of effort to obtain. According to Article
4—IRs EU 2019/947, “UAS operations are classified in the open category only where the
following requirements are met [22]:
Drones 2021, 5, 63 6 of 16
• UAS has a class that is set out in DRs EU 2019/945
• UAS maximum take-off mass should be less than 25 kg
• UAS operation is conducted in the visual line of sight VLOS and the UAS is kept at a
safe distance of at least 1.5 km from inhabited areas, airports and sensitive zones, and
at least 100 m from infrastructure like highways, hospitals, power plants, etc.
• During an operation, UAS do not carry dangerous goods and do not drop any material
• Flying height is limited to 120 m above the surface of the Earth”.
From an operational point of view, the new rules divide the open category into three
subcategories: A1, A2 and A3, depending on the operation distance to persons, and which
result in different restrictions concerning the weight of the UAS and the certification of the
pilot. The classification is based on UAS class-identification showing technical properties
of UAS and operational requirements to be considered during operational processes.
According to this class-identification, UAS are structured into the seven classes C0 to C6
(Table 1).
Table 1. UAS classes (C0–C6) according to technical properties and operational requirements. Source: Delegated Rules EU
2020/1058.
Subcategory Class MTOM Incl.Payload Velocity Max. AGL Proof of Knowledge
A1
Fly over people
C0 <250 g max 19 m/s 120 m Familiar with operationinstructions
C1 <900 g max 19 m/s 120 m
Familiar with operation
instructions
Online training and test
A2
Fly close to people C2 <4 kg - 120 m
Familiar with operation
instructions
Online training and test
Certificate “proof of knowledge”
(according to German rules)
A3
Fly far from people
C3 <25 kg<Diameter 3m - 120 m Familiar with operation
instructions
Online training and test
C4 <25 kg - -
- C5 No max. MTOM
defined
- -
- C6 max 50 m/s -
In the subcategory A1, UAS operators—if to fly with class C0—do not need to obtain
an operating permit or submit an operating declaration before commencing operations. In
addition, UAS operations in A1 shall not be conducted over open-air assemblies of persons.
In contrast, remote operation—flying with class C1—requires that remote pilots are familiar
with the UAS user manual guide and have passed an online training course. The main
difference between C0 and C1 is the MTOM, which is a maximum of 250 g vs. 900 g.
Regarding the subcategory A2, remote pilots must be familiar with the UAS user guide
and have to hold a remote pilot certificate. In addition to that, UAS operation must not be
conducted over and always at a safe distance from uninvolved persons. In this context, it is
essential to have a high safety level, to respect the privacy and environmental requirements.
Finally, by flights in the subcategory A3—fly far from people—remote pilots have to
be familiar with the UAS user guide, too. However, the UAS operations must occur in
an area where the remote pilot can reasonably expect that no uninvolved persons will be
endangered within the range where the UAS will be operated. Within this scenario, UAS
pilots have to maintain a horizontal safety distance from public utilities and residential,
industrial, or recreational areas.
The technical properties and operational requirements did not define a maximum
Above Ground Level (AGL) in the classes C4, C5 und C6, but mentioned that “during
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flight, provide the remote pilot with clear and concise information on the height of the
UAS above the surface or take-off point” [22].
However, when at least one of the above listed requirements is not met, then the
operation no longer belongs to the open category. For instance, when a UAS is operated
beyond visual of line. Another example is operating a 15 kg UAS close to a gathering of
people; in this case, within A2, this is limited to a maximum MTOM of 4 kg.
• “Specific” category of UAS operations
If, for certain reasons, one or more of the regulations of the open category cannot be
complied with, the specific category takes effect because a higher risk can be expected.
From this point of view, the specific category laid down rules covering UAS operations
presenting a higher risk during flying for which a thorough assessment should be carried
out to indicate which measures are needed to keep the operation as safe as possible. In
such scenarios, either an operating permit is required or a prior declaration must be made.
To obtain an operating license, a risk assessment is necessary and has to be reviewed by the
competent authority. This is much more extensive than a simple declaration. According
to IRs EU 2019/947—Article 11 [22], an operational risk assessment shall include, but is
not limited to “(a) description of UAS operation, (b) proposal for maintaining operational
safety, (c) identification of ground and air risks to, for example, uninvolved persons,
objects, etc., (d) measures for risk mitigation, (e) technical characteristics of the UAS and
(f) competencies of the personnel”.
In order to conduct the operational risk assessment required by the abovementioned
Article 11 of the UAS Regulation, the Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA) can be
applied. SORA is the methodology developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on
Unmanned Systems JARUS (http://jarus-rpas.org/) (accessed on 4 May 2021) to perform
risk assessment and, therefore, to safely conduct UAS operations [24]. More details about
this approach and its concept are available at EASA, 2019/947. The SORA concept and an
example for ALADINA will be discussed in Section 4.3.
• “Certified” category of UAS operations.
According to IRs EU 2019/947—Article 6 [22], the operating of UAS missions is
considered in the certified operation category if the UAS is certified pursuant to Article 40
of DRs EU 2019/945. In addition, operations can be classified in the certified category, if
the competent authority may assess the operational risk such that the operation falls into
the certified category. Certifying UAS covers the design, production and maintenance of
UAS. It is definitively required if the UAS meets any of the following conditions: “(a) the
dimension of the UAS is at least 3 m and designed to be operated over assemblies of people,
(b) it is designed for the transport of people, and (c) it is designed to transport dangerous
goods and requires a high level of robustness to mitigate risks to third parties in the event
of an accident”. The certified category includes, in addition to the certification of the UAS
itself, the certification of the entire operation, i.e., the operating company, the remote pilots,
the maintenance of the UAS, the monitoring of the maintenance Continuing Airworthiness
Management Organization (CAMO).
4. Impact of New Regulations on UAS Operation
Although the new regulations are seen as a positive step towards harmonizing UAS
rules in Europe, they will inevitably lead to new challenges and restrictions that influence
UAS operations and uses. In addition, it is expected that the challenges and limitations
will not only have an impact on UAS pilots, but also on the manufacturers who are looking
for a clear legal framework that helps ensuring a high level of rule compliance. However,
the following subsections address important challenges and limitations that might be at
least faced in the early stages of applying the new EU drone rules.
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4.1. Challenges with UAS Registration
New UAS regulations in Europe are considered as an important step to move towards
rule harmonization and better accommodating of UAS operations, but it might be feared
that UAS owners, pilots, operators and manufacturers will find the regulations cumbersome
due to the administrative and bureaucratic complexities in rule interpretation. In addition,
the regulations are under development and might change continuously, and this will lead,
on the one hand, to instability of UAS legal operational framework and, on the other hand,
to some confusion during the achievement of administrative and bureaucratic processes. To
clarify the idea, we refer to the registration of UAS operators and certified UAS. According
to the Article 14 from EU drone regulations [22], the rules impose that a registration system
of UAS and users should be established by EU member states for “UAS whose design is
subject to certification and for UAS operators whose operation may present a risk to safety,
security, privacy, and protection of personal data or environment”. From this statement, it
is to understand that the registration process depends on UAS design and risks which are
the main factors respected with the defining UAS operation categories (Section 3.2). This
means that the intended registration system is dependent on—among other things—the
operation category where the UAS should be operated. So, once again, according to Article
14, a registration is required when flying in the open category if the UAS meets any of the
following conditions: (a) MTOM is 250 g or more, (b) UAS is integrated with a payload like
for instance a sensor that could be used for personal data collection. In contrast, when it is
to fly in the specific category, the registration of UAS is mandatory. To this end, the rules
have clearly addressed who should register, and when, but realizing the aforementioned
registration system in a practical way is still a key challenge. This is due to the fact that
each EU member state has to create an online platform for the registration process, which
does not yet exist in many EU countries. As a result, the interoperability, mutual access
and exchange of registration information might be affected.
Another issue to be respected is the protection of personal data. Within the registration
process, personal information should be provided, such as the full name, date of birth,
addresses of UAS operators, etc. In many EU countries, data protection laws are strongly
enforced and, therefore, data interoperability and mutual access at the EU level are currently
unrealistic or at least require further efforts to develop reasonable systems for registration
that enable data exchange with a high security level. Of course, this requires databases that
document, manage and analyze the collected data. Here, involved specialists, operators
and managers have to work closely together to define which parameters and issues are
necessary and should be respected in the database design.
4.2. Visibility and Range Restrictions
The main criteria of most UAS regulations revolve around the limitations of UAS
operations and refer to restrictions of flight missions [4]. To express the idea here, we refer
to the visibility and range restrictions in terms of height levels and horizontal distances
allowed during UAS operations; namely operating UAS with visual/beyond line-of-sight
(VLOS/BVLOS) conditions (Figure 3). According to the recent EU rules, UAS operations
classified in the open category are only allowed with VLOS of the remote pilot (Section 3.2).
Within this scenario, pilots must maintain continuous visual contact with UAS. VLOS
is particularly interpreted to mean up to 500 m horizontally and 120 m vertically [25],
but for large and well-visible systems (striking painting, position lights), altitudes up to
1000 or even 1500 m, and a radius of 1.5 km around the operator, have been accepted as
VLOS (see measurements in [5,6,11]). In practical usage, UAS are sometimes operated
beyond the aforementioned distance limitations as extended visual line of sight (EVLOS).
Within EVLOS-based operations, pilots need additional observers or remote pilots to keep
continuous visual contact with UAS. Under these conditions, and regarding the economic
viability of UAS-based applications, both VLOS and EVLOS scenarios are not the best
option for the commercial UAS sector, where flight missions beyond visual line of sight
(BVLOS) are hugely valuable due to the fact that they enable UAS to cover long distances
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and large areas beyond the visual range of the remote pilot; especially when obstacles such
as buildings and mountains could be encountered during VLOS flight missions.
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Getting rid of VLOS confinements is possible by operating UAS in the specific or
certified categories. It is agreed that operations in these categories can be a solution to
achieve BVLOS flights, but at the same time and from a practical point of view, it imposes
ad itional process and requir ments, such as conducting an operational risk assessment,
for instance that based on JARUS SORA, which in itself is a complex issue directly affecting
UAS operation. This will be highlighted in the next section.
4.3. Operational Risk Assessment
The risk assessment of UAS operations reflects the safety level associated with UAS
during operating time. A safety level reflection needs to make safety risks measurable
and, therefore, risks can be evaluated and controlled. The new EU drone rules adopted
a risk assessment as a fundamental issue that is requested for flights in the specific and
certified categories. In practice, the assessment of a UAS operation risk is an important
step towards creating safe flight missions, but at the same time realizing a reasonable and
acceptable risk assessment is still challenging, because it involves different responsibilities
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and processes that extend beyond a single agency or organization. Furthermore, it needs
to be balanced between various complex factors and data coming from social, technical,
political and economic aspects [26]. Collecting and characterizing risks that may occur
during UAS operations need to describe, on the one hand, the UAS environment where the
UAS is flown, and on the other hand, the risk nature such as the ground risk (e.g., damage
of third parties on the ground) or the air risk (e.g., flying into forbidden zones). It dictates
having sufficient information, data and resources which are not always available and/or
outdated. Currently, the new rules mentioned that the operational risk assessment can
be conducted based on the SORA developed by the joint authorities for rulemaking on
unmanned systems [22]. The paradigm implemented in SORA is to minimize the impact
of a possible drone risk, which means damage to third parties on the ground or in the air;
however, this classification is only done based on general rules and estimated from the
properties of the UAS type used for the mission, the type of air space, and the population
of the area where it is operated.
Key elements of the SORA classification are the “risk” and “robustness”. “Risk” is
defined according to SAE ARP 4754A/EUROCAE ED-79A as “the combination of the
frequency (probability) of an occurrence and its associated level of severity”. The term risk
is only applied for detrimental events. “Robustness” defines the requirements for UAS
operation for different risk classes. The level of robustness can be low, medium or high.
Operations with higher risks require higher levels of robustness [22].
For a SORA classification, the concept of operation (ConOps) has to be defined first,
comprising technical details, missions, checklists and safety aspects. Technical details
include information on the UAS fuselage (dimensions, MTOM, loads, subsystems such
as hydraulic systems, brakes, parachute, sensors), performance characteristics (maximum
flight altitude, climb and descent rate, air speed, maximum air speed, limitations induced
by icing, precipitation, turbulence and other parameters), propulsion system (engine type
and number of engines, engine power, electric system, maximum current), control system
(flaps, pitch elevator, aileron, actuators), sensors for operation, payload (power supply,
impact on flight parameters), navigation, autopilot, flight control, ground control station,
detect and avoid system, compliance with geo-fencing, take-off and landing equipment,
and implemented functions such as flight termination system or automatic recovery system.
The risk is subdivided into the “ground risk” and the “air risk”. The ground risk class
(GRC) defines the risk to uninvolved persons on the ground in the case of control loss of the
UAS. According to SORA, there are five different scenarios determining the ground risk:
• VLOS or BVLOS in controlled areas (such as military areas);
• VLOS in sparsely populated areas;
• BVLOS in sparsely populated areas;
• VLOS in populated areas;
• BVLOS in populated areas.
Therefore, the operation site and area, called volume of operations, have to be well
defined in advance. Further, air speed, mass and wingspan are important. The ground risk
class can be determined based on the technical specifications (Table 2).
The typical air speed and mass are used to calculate the expected typical kinetic energy.
The wingspan is used as the “maximum UAS characteristics dimension”. As an example,
the risk of operating ALADINA is assessed in the following according to SORA. For the
estimation of the typical kinetic energy and the resulting ground risk class (GRC) the
following values are assumed:
• Mass m = 25 kg; air speed VTAS = 25 m/s; wingspan b = 3.6 m;
• The kinetic energy is calculated to be 7.8 kJ;
• With a wingspan of 3.6 m, this results in risk class <8 m, <1084 kJ;
As a next step, the flight scenario needs to be chosen. ALADINA is operated up to
altitudes of 1000 or 1500 m, with a radius of 1500 m around the operator. The measurement
site is usually chosen in a way that no villages or infrastructure are overflown. In the past,
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altitudes have been accepted as VLOS, as ALADINA is a large aircraft with striking colors
and illumination. Therefore, the scenario is “VLOS in sparsely populated environment”,
resulting in a preliminary ground risk class of 4 according to Table 2.
Table 2. Determination of ground risk class according to SORA. This table is from JARUS guidelines on Specific Operations
Risk Assessment (SORA), 2019, p. 20.
Intrinsic UAS Ground Risk Class
Max UAS characteristics dimension 1 m 3 m 8 m >8 m
Typical kinetic energy expected <700 J <34 kJ <1084 kJ >1084 kJ
Operational scenarios
VLOS/BVLOS over controlled ground area 1 2 3 4
VLOS in sparsely populated environment 2 3 4 5
BVLOS in sparsely populated environment 3 4 5 6
VLOS in populated environment 4 5 6 8
BVLOS in populated environment 5 6 8 10
VLOS over gathering of people 7
BVLOS over gathering of people 8
There are different options for ground risk mitigations according to SORA (Table 3),
and each sequence reduces the ground risk class, depending on the level of robustness.
Table 3. Ground risk mitigation for different robustness levels—JARUS guidelines on SORA, p. 21.
Robustness
Mitigation Sequence Mitigations for Ground Risk Low/None Medium High
M1 Strategic mitigations for ground risk 0: None−1: Low −2 −4
M2 Effects of ground impact are reduced 0 −1 −2
M3 An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is in place,operator validated and effective 1 0 −1
The strategic mitigation includes measures to reduce the risk for persons on ground,
e.g., by establishing a horizontal buffer zone of the same dimension as the flight altitude
that cannot be entered by third parties. The effects of ground impact can be reduced, e.g.,
by applying an emergency parachute. Depending on the robustness of the system (e.g.,
redundancy), this can significantly reduce the ground risk. The third possibility to reduce
the ground risk is an emergency plan for the case of loss of control. This emergency plan
needs to be well established, as a missing plan can even enhance the ground risk. Strategic
mitigation—in this case, a 1:1 buffer zone of at least 1500 m to the next village, and a valid
emergency response plan—reduce the ground risk class of ALADINA to 3.
The air risk class (ARC) is an index for the risk of a collision with a manned aircraft.
Four classes of air risk are defined: for ARC-a, the risk of collision is so low that no strategic
measures have to be taken. The risk increases up to ARC-d. The air risk class depends on
the air space and expected air traffic and can be determined with the flow chart of Figure 5.
For ARC-b to ARC-d, the risk can be mitigated by several methods.
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Figure 5. Criteria for air risk class. Source: JARUS guidelines on SORA, 2019, p. 23.
As ALADINA is in an atypically controlled airspace during flight (air space reserved
by NOTAM), it falls into the lowest air risk category ARC-a. Additionally ALADINA can
be equipped with an ADS-B receiver, which receives position signals from other aircrafts
and further reduces the risk of collision.
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Based on the values of air risk and ground risk, the “Specific Assurance and Integrity
Levels (SAIL)” are determined (Table 4). The SAIL parameter determines the requirements
for the Operational Safety Objectives (OSO).
Table 4. Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels (SAIL) according to SORA (JARUS, p. 27). For the
example of ALADINA, which is discussed in the text, the value is marked in yellow.
SAIL Determination
Residual ARC
Final GRC a b c d
≤2 I II IV VI
3 II II IV VI
4 III III IV VI
5 IV IV IV VI
6 V V V VI
7 VI VI VI VI
>7 Category C operation
The assessments described above for ALADINA result in a SAIL Level of II. This level
requires the implementation of an “optional” or “low minimum security” standard. The
difference to the requirement “Medium” is the quality of the operational procedures for
normal operation, deteriorated systems, human errors, and adverse operating conditions.
Requirements for robustness: This section is based on JARUS, Annex E—Integrity and
assurance levels for the Operation Safety Objectives (OSO), JARUS guidelines on Specific
Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), 2019. There are different aspects that have to be
analyzed for determining the correct level of integrity and assurance. The full specifications
are provided in the JARUS guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA),
2019. A few examples of the aspects that have to be considered are the following:
• Competent or approved operator;
• Manufacturing of the UAS by competent entity;
• Competent maintenance;
• Compliance with design standard;
• System safety and reliability;
• Suitable command, control, and communication practices;
• Inspection of the UAS for compliance with the ConOps;
• Definition, validation and compliance with technical requirements and concerning
human failure;
• Training and ability of the crew to deal with abnormal situations (covering technical
and human failure);
• Safe recovery from technical problems;
• Procedures to deal with external disturbance;
• Appropriate external support for the mission;
• Coordination between the crew members;
• Operational crew (fit in physical and psychological sense);
• Automatic protection of the UAS against human failure;
• Handling of human failure;
• Human–machine interface;
• Detection and avoidance of critical environmental conditions;
• Definition and control of critical limits for operation;
• Construction and qualification for adverse conditions.
For the full extensive descriptions of each OSO, the reader is referred to the original
document. As an example, OSO#1 (Competent or approved operator) is described in more
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detail: For low integrity, the operator has to be informed about each flight of the UAS.
Checklists, maintenance and training procedures and a clearly formulated responsibility
and duty distribution have to be established. The ConOps have to be specified. For a
medium or high integrity, the operator has to be appropriate for the mission. This means
that the complexity of the mission can be handled with the operator’s resources. The
operator has to be capable of identifying risks and performing means of mitigation. Before
the first flight, an audit of a third party is required.
• Semantic data impact on risk assessment.
The actual flight trajectory cannot always be optimized only with respect to mitigating
the impact of accidents or crashes. This is due to using—in most cases—only spatial data
(e.g., like object geometry) for planning the flight trajectory. Implementing spatial data
does not deliver the sufficient information needed for a safe path planning, navigation,
and a reasonable risk assessment, for, e.g., a sufficient description of places is not always
possible. For this reason, there are also other ideas of using semantic data to characterize
objects and actions in the UAS environment related to operation. Semantics describe the
object structure of an environment including contextual information, attributes, and their
interrelationships, that is, non-spatial data. Exploiting semantic information beside spatial
data in UAS operation can, on the one hand, improve the operational aspects and the time
complexity of the planning process, which otherwise could be undesirably high. On the
other hand, semantics can provide meaningful information for an enriched description of
the current status of the scene and related constraints and rules that should be respected
during an UAS operation.
To express the impact of semantic information on UAS path planning and risk as-
sessment, we point to a practical example: the contextual term “bridge” indicates that
this object is an important topological (traffic) connection between two regions. From a
geometrical point of view, it might indicate that the bridge connects two shores of a river.
In order to illustrate the dynamic character of semantic information, the following example
is provided: The bridge is crossing the shortest path between two nodes on the trajectory
of a UAV flight, but during rush hour it might be advisable to cross the river at a certain
distance to the bridge in order to mitigate the risk for vehicles/people crossing the bridge,
keeping in mind that additional energy must be spent. However, at certain times, outside
of rush hour, it might be more suitable to cross the river closer to the bridge in order to
save time and energy, knowing that the risk for objects on the ground is minimal. In short,
the geometric and (dynamic) semantic representation of the UAS environment have to be
coherently structured with a link in-between to ensure that consistent datasets form a con-
venient data source for mission planning to infer information from the urban environment
of UAS. The benefit expected is to have the potential of providing a high level of safety
in UAS management system through geometry and semantics-based definition of clear
and simple rules that help operators and authorities in operating UAS as safely as possible.
Though such kind of smart trajectory planning is—to the best of our knowledge—not
available yet, it might have impact on the actual, individual risk assessment.
5. Conclusions
In summary, the new EU regulations provide detailed guidelines of how to define
operations, identify risks and analyze situations prior to the deployment of UAS. An
extensive documentation is required, depending on the risk and robustness of the planned
mission, the UAS, and the operator. Safety measures include technical documentation
and checks, as well as crew training and the analysis of the situation of the operation. For
complex missions, the development towards standardized procedures and documentations
such as those in manned air traffic helps to obtain flight permissions from the corresponding
authorities. From a commercial point of view the regulations bring a certain level of
reliability into economic considerations—it is worth for UAS producers to invest into safety
measures in order to obtain a certain SORA classification.
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